What did the premium analysis find?
IndeMed found no measurable premium penalty associated with federal IDR in its state comparisons. Average employer premiums rose 21.4% from 2021 through 2025 in 28 states plus DC where federal IDR applied to all plans, compared with 22.0% in 21 state-law states. After comparing each group's post-2021 growth with its own earlier trend, the reported difference was 0.1 percentage points.
The marketplace comparison also ran against the prediction that arbitration would produce faster growth. From 2021 through 2025, benchmark premiums rose 9.5% in federal-IDR states, 10.1% in state-arbitration states, and 22% in the nine states classified as using a fixed payment rate. IndeMed expressly states that it is not claiming fixed rates caused the higher marketplace growth.
How did IndeMed compare the payment models?
The analysis uses the No Surprises Act's division between state and federal authority as a natural comparison. In 28 states plus DC without a specified state payment law, state-regulated and self-insured plans use federal IDR. In 21 states with a qualifying state law, the state rule continues to govern state-regulated plans, while self-insured employer plans use federal IDR in every state.
IndeMed reviewed state premium growth from 2017 through 2025 using the AHRQ Medical Expenditure Panel Survey–Insurance Component, or MEPS-IC, for employer single coverage. It also used KFF State Health Facts marketplace benchmark premiums for 2019 through 2026. The central pre/post comparisons use 2021 as the baseline and end in 2025.
The published method calculates log changes by state and reports unweighted means of state growth rates. It also presents weighted checks, a difference-in-differences calculation, a two-way fixed-effects check for employer premiums, comparisons based on IDR volume, and a review of insurer rate filings. Alaska was excluded from the main analysis because its premium series was treated as an outlier.
What do the employer and marketplace comparisons show?
The employer series moved almost in parallel. Before federal IDR, from 2017 through 2021, employer premiums rose 15.2% in the later federal-IDR group and 16.0% in the state-law group. From 2021 through 2025, they rose 21.4% and 22.0%. Both groups accelerated by roughly six points after 2021, leaving no visible four-point gap of the kind IndeMed says would follow from a recurring one-percent annual IDR effect.
The marketplace series provides a cleaner distinction because every marketplace plan is state-regulated. IndeMed reports 2021–2025 growth of 9.5% in federal-IDR states, 10.1% in state-arbitration states, and 22% in fixed-rate states. California's average employer premium rose from $6,295 in 2017 to $9,162 in 2025, moving from below the national average to above it while the state's fixed-rate framework was in effect.
Those comparisons show that a fixed-rate model did not produce an observable premium advantage in the periods studied. They also show no measurable premium divergence in the direction predicted for federal IDR.
What can the evidence establish, and what remains uncertain?
The analysis is meaningful because it tests a prediction against public premium data and discloses its state classifications and method. Its employer and marketplace results point in the same direction, and the publication includes several sensitivity checks.
It does not prove that federal IDR has zero effect on premiums or establish causation. State insurance markets differ in medical prices, utilization, demographics, plan design, competition, regulation, and subsidy effects. In the employer series, self-insured plans use federal IDR in every state, which reduces the contrast between the two groups. The marketplace is a cleaner policy comparison but a smaller and more volatile market.
The state categories also compress different statutes into a primary payment model. Fixed-rate states differ from one another and from arbitration states in other factors that could affect premiums. IndeMed acknowledges this point when it declines to attribute the fixed-rate states' higher marketplace growth to the payment rule itself.
Accordingly, the supported conclusion is narrower: these state premium trends do not reveal the substantial federal-IDR premium increase asserted by critics, and the fixed-rate states studied did not display lower premium growth. Claims of a specific causal effect still require transparent plan-level analysis.
Halkovich Law's commentary
The policy debate should begin with a basic discipline: a reported IDR award is not the same thing as an incremental premium cost. The relevant question is what the plan would have paid without IDR, what it actually paid, whether the award was collected, what administrative expense was incurred, and whether that difference materially affected the premium.
IndeMed's work is useful because it examines the outcome patients and employers ultimately experience. If federal arbitration were a major recurring driver of premium growth, a divergence should be detectable where state-regulated plans entered federal IDR and absent where state law continued to govern. The published series does not show that pattern.
The fixed-rate comparison also matters. Reducing out-of-network physician payment does not automatically demonstrate that patients received lower premiums. A benchmark proposal should be evaluated on actual pass-through, contracting effects, network adequacy, physician-practice stability, patient access, and total premium experience.
This analysis should inform the debate, not end it. Insurers, employers, providers, and regulators hold different parts of the evidence. A credible evaluation requires those records to be connected and the assumptions made public.
What should providers and policymakers examine next?
- Connect awards to actual payments. Separate the plan's initial payment, the final offer, the IDR award, the amount collected, fees, and payment delay.
- Identify the counterfactual. State what the claim would have cost under the proposed fixed rate, the QPA, a negotiated amount, or the applicable state process.
- Separate plan types. Fully insured and self-insured plans follow different regulatory paths, and blending them can weaken a state comparison.
- Publish rate-filing support. If IDR is included in a premium request, disclose the affected claim volume, calculation method, period, and actuarial treatment.
- Measure pass-through. Test whether lower provider payment produces lower premiums or changes another part of the plan's economics.
- Track access and consolidation. Review network participation, appointment access, contracting changes, and practice ownership alongside premium results.
Frequently asked questions
Did IndeMed find that federal IDR increased employer premiums?
Did fixed payment rates lower marketplace premiums?
Why are self-insured plans important to the comparison?
Does this prove IDR has no premium effect?
What would make the premium claim more testable?
Sources and scope
This article is Halkovich Law's original provider-side commentary on IndeMed's “Premium Trends by Payment Model: Arbitration and Fixed Rate.” IndeMed is an independent-physician association and advocacy organization. Its conclusions are presented here as the association's analysis, not as official CMS findings or a conclusive causal estimate.
The underlying publication cites MEPS-IC employer-premium data, KFF marketplace benchmark-premium data, CMS state-law classifications and IDR tables, insurer rate filings, and related research. Halkovich Law reviewed the publication's reported figures, classifications, methodology, and stated limitations. This page provides general information and is not legal or actuarial advice for a particular plan, claim, rate filing, or dispute.
Evaluate the full reimbursement record.
Halkovich Law can review payer payment patterns, IDR eligibility, portfolio economics, unpaid determinations, and the documentation needed to pursue recovery.